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RAUL L. LAMBINO et al vs COMELEC G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006 part 8

EN BANC

G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, JR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe, respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

SEPARATE OPINION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Introduction

The fate of every democracy, of every government based on the Sovereignty of the people, depends on the choices it makes between these opposite principles: absolute power on the one hand, and on the other the restraints of legality and the authority of tradition.
—John Acton

In this thorny matter of the people's initiative, I concur with the erudite and highly persuasive opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno upholding the people's initiative and raise some points of my own.

The issue of the people's power to propose amendments to the Constitution was once discussed in the landmark case of Santiago v. COMELEC.1 Almost a decade later, the issue is once again before the Court, and I firmly believe it is time to reevaluate the pronouncements made in that case.

The issue of Charter Change is one that has sharply divided the nation, and its proponents and opponents will understandably take all measures to advance their position and defeat that of their opponents. The wisdom or folly of Charter Change does not concern the Court. The only thing that the Court must review is the validity of the present step taken by the proponents of Charter Change, which is the People's Initiative, as set down in Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution:

Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

In the Santiago case, the Court discussed whether the second paragraph of that section had been fulfilled. It determined that Congress had not provided for the implementation of the exercise of the people's initiative, when it held that Republic Act No. 6735, or "The Initiative and Referendum Act," was "inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation."2

With all due respect to those Justices who made that declaration, I must disagree.

Republic Act No. 6735 is the proper law for proposing constitutional amendments and it should not have been considered inadequate.

The decision in Santiago focused on what it perceived to be fatal flaws in the drafting of the law, in the failings of the way the law was structured, to come to the conclusion that the law was inadequate. The Court itself recognized the legislators' intent, but disregarded this intent. The law was found wanting. The Court then saw the inclusion of the Constitution in RA 6735 as an afterthought. However, it was included, and it should not be excluded by the Court via a strained analysis of the law. The difficult construction of the law should not serve to frustrate the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution: to give the people the power to propose amendments as they saw fit. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute.3 The intent of the legislature was clear, and yet RA 6735 was declared inadequate. It was not specifically struck down or declared unconstitutional, merely incomplete. The Court focused on what RA 6735 was not, and lost sight of what RA 6735 was.

It is my view that the reading of RA 6735 in Santiago should have been more flexible. It is also a basic precept of statutory construction that statutes should be construed not so much according to the letter that killeth but in line with the purpose for which they have been enacted.4 The reading of the law should not have been with the view of its defeat, but with the goal of upholding it, especially with its avowed noble purpose.

Congress has done its part in empowering the people themselves to propose amendments to the Constitution, in accordance with the Constitution itself. It should not be the Supreme Court that stifles the people, and lets their cries for change go unheard, especially when the Constitution itself grants them that power.

The court's ruling in the Santiago case does not bar the present petition because the fallo in the Santiago case is limited to the Delfin petition.

The Santiago case involved a petition for prohibition filed by Miriam Defensor-Santiago, et al., against the COMELEC, et al., which sought to prevent the COMELEC from entertaining the "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" filed by Atty. Jesus Delfin. In the body of the judgment, the Court made the following conclusion, viz:

This petition must then be granted and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition or initiative on amendments on the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system (emphasis supplied).

We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people under that system.

In the said case, the Court's fallo states as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R. A. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED against private respondents.

Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

SO ORDERED.

The question now is if the ruling in Santiago is decisive in this case. It is elementary that when there is conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of the decision and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the judgment, the former prevails over the latter. An order of execution is based on the disposition, not on the body, of the decision.5 The dispositive portion is its decisive resolution; thus, it is the subject of execution. The other parts of the decision may be resorted to in order to determine the ratio decidendi for the disposition. Where there is conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the decision, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order, while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. Hence, the execution must conform with that which is ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.6

A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is an informal expression of the views of the court and cannot prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment. So there is a distinction between the findings and conclusions of a court and its Judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount to the rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. It is not infrequent that the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court, especially those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in judicial decisions lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear on the issues or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the decision.7

Applying the foregoing argument to the Santiago case, it immediately becomes apparent that the disposition in the latter case categorically made permanent the December 18, 1996 Temporary Restraining Order issued against the COMELEC in the Delfin petition but did NOT formally incorporate therein any directive PERMANENTLY enjoining the COMELEC "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments." Undeniably, the perpetual proscription against the COMELEC from assuming jurisdiction over any other petition on Charter Change through a People's Initiative is just a conclusion and cannot bind the poll body, for such unending ban would trench on its constitutional power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall under Section 2, Article IX of the Constitution. RA 6735 gave the COMELEC the jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the petition on the initiative under Section 8, Rule 11 and the form of the petition under Section 3, Rule I; hence, it cannot be barred from entertaining any such petition.

In sum, the COMELEC still retains its jurisdiction to take cognizance of any petition on initiative under RA 6735 and it can rule on the petition and its action can only be passed upon by the Court when the same is elevated through a petition for certiorari. COMELEC cannot be barred from acting on said petitions since jurisdiction is conferred by law (RA 6735) and said law has not been declared unconstitutional and hence still valid though considered inadequate in the Santiago case.

Respondents, however, claim that the Court in the subsequent case of PIRMA v. Commission on Elections8 confirmed the statement of the Court in the Santiago case that the COMELEC was "permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments." Much reliance is placed on the ruling contained in a Minute Resolution which reads:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of Discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in Dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only Complied with the DISPOSITIONS in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.

Take note that the Court specifically referred to "dispositions" in the March 19, 1997 Decision. To reiterate, the dispositions in the Santiago case decision refer specifically to the December 18, 1996 TRO being made permanent against the COMELEC but do not pertain to a permanent injunction against any other petition for initiative on amendment. Thus, what was confirmed or even affirmed in the Minute Resolution in the PIRMA case pertains solely to the December 18, 1996 TRO which became permanent, the declaration of the inadequacy of RA 6735, and the annulment of certain parts of Resolution No. 2300 but certainly not the alleged perpetual injunction against the initiative petition. Thus, the resolution in the PIRMA case cannot be considered res judicata to the Lambino petition.

Amendment or Revision

One last matter to be considered is whether the petition may be allowed under RA 6735, since only amendments to the Constitution may be the subject of a people's initiative.

The Lambino petition cannot be considered an act of revising the Constitution; it is merely an attempt to amend it. The term amendment has to be liberally construed so as to effectuate the people's efforts to amend the Constitution.

As an eminent constitutionalist, Dean Vicente G. Sinco,9 explained:

Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the entire document. It may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.

The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.

In this case, the Lambino petition is not concerned with rewriting the entire Constitution. It was never its intention to revise the whole Constitution. It merely concerns itself with amending a few provisions in our fundamental charter.

When there are gray areas in legislation, especially in matters that pertain to the sovereign people's political rights, courts must lean more towards a more liberal interpretation favoring the people's right to exercise their sovereign power.

Conclusion

Sovereignty residing in the people is the highest form of sovereignty and thus deserves the highest respect even from the courts. It is not something that can be overruled, set aside, ignored or stomped over by whatever amount of technicalities, blurred or vague provisions of the law.

As I find RA 6735 to be adequate as the implementing law for the People's Initiative, I vote to grant the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 174299. The Amended Petition for Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado should be remanded to the COMELEC for determination whether or not the petition is sufficient under RA 6735, and if the petition is sufficient, to schedule and hold the necessary plebiscite as required by RA 6735.

It is time to let the people's voice be heard once again as it was twenty years ago. And should this voice demand a change in the Constitution, the Supreme Court should not be one to stand in its way.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 Including Sigaw ng Bayan and Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP).

2 This provision states: "Requirements. — x x x x

(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;

c.2. the proposition;

c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;

c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition."

3 This provision states: "Verification of Signatures. — The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election."

4 Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI will be changed thus:

Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least one member.

(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof, except those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership coming from the parliamentary districts.

5 Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Article VII will be changed thus:

Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.

6 Sections 1-5 of the Transitory Provisions read:

Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.

(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.

Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress", "Senate", "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that any and all references therein to "Member[s] of Congress", "Senator[s]" or "Member[s] of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member[s] of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister".

Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided however that any and all references therein to "Congress", "Senate", "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that any and all references therein to "Member[s] of Congress", "Senator[s]" or "Member[s] of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member[s] of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister".

Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.

(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim Parliament from among themselves.

(3) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.

Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President.

(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. Thereafter, the Vice President, as Member of Parliament, shall immediately convene the Parliament and shall initially preside over its session for the purpose of electing the Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of all

its members, from among themselves. The duly elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of incumbent President and Vice President.

7 As revised, Article XVIII contained a new paragraph in Section 4 (paragraph 3) and a modified paragraph 2, Section 5, thus:

Section 4. x x x x

(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.

x x x x

Section 5. x x x x

(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. The duly elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President.

8 336 Phil. 848 (1997); Resolution dated 10 June 1997.

9 The COMELEC held:

We agree with the Petitioners that this Commission has the solemn Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of, as in this case, initiative.

This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other provisions of the Constitution particularly on initiative.

Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

The afore-quoted provision of the Constitution being a non self-executory provision needed an enabling law for its implementation. Thus, in order to breathe life into the constitutional right of the people under a system of initiative to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolution, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735.

However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Santiago vs. Commission on Elections struck down the said law for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.

The Supreme Court likewise declared that this Commission should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the required minimum per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein, still the Petition cannot be given due course since the Supreme Court categorically declared R.A. No. 6735 as inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental importance of the right of the people under a system of initiative. However, neither can we turn a blind eye to the pronouncement of the High Court that in the absence of a valid enabling law, this right of the people remains nothing but an "empty right", and that this Commission is permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Considering the foregoing, We are therefore constrained not to entertain or give due course to the instant Petition.

10 Arturo M. De Castro; Ronald L. Adamat, Rolando Manuel Rivera, Ruelo Baya; Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (PTGWO); Trade Union Congress of the Philippines; Sulong Bayan Movement Foundation, Inc.

11 Onevoice Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc.; Atty. Pete Quirino Quadra; Bayan, Bayan Muna, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Head, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Jojo Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, Dr. Reginald Pamugas; Loretta Ann P. Rosales, and Mario Joyo Aguja, Ana Theresa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Luwalhati Ricasa Antonino; Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA), Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C. Toledo, Mariano M. Tajon, Froilan M. Bacungan, Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., Fortunato P. Aguas, and Amado Gat Inciong; Senate of the Philippines; Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador and Randall C. Tabayoyong, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Cebu City and Cebu Province Chapters; Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio R. Osmeňa III, Jamby Madrigal, Jinggoy Estrada, Alfredo S. Lim and Panfilo Lacson; Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino.

12 This provision states: "Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years."

13 I RECORD, 387-388.

14 During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento made the following report (I RECORD 389):

MR. SARMIENTO: Madam President, I am happy that the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions decided to retain the system of initiative as a mode of amending the Constitution. I made a survey of American constitutions and I discovered that 13 States provide for a system of initiative as a mode of amending the Constitution — Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma and Oregon. The initiative for ordinary laws only is used in Idaho, Maine, Montana and South Dakota. So, I am happy that this was accepted or retained by the Committee.

x x x x

The Americans in turn copied the concept of initiatives from the Swiss beginning in 1898 when South Dakota adopted the initiative in its constitution. The Swiss cantons experimented with initiatives in the 1830s. In 1891, the Swiss incorporated the initiative as a mode of amending their national constitution. Initiatives promote "direct democracy" by allowing the people to directly propose amendments to the constitution. In contrast, the traditional mode of changing the constitution is known as "indirect democracy" because the amendments are referred to the voters by the legislature or the constitutional convention.

15 Florida requires only that the title and summary of the proposed amendment are "printed in clear and unambiguous language." Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General RE Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, No. 90160, 22 January 1998, Supreme Court of Florida.

16 State ex. rel Patton v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E. 872 (1933); Whitman v. Moore, 59 Ariz. 211, 125 P.2d 445 (1942); Heidtman v. City of Shaker Heights, 99 Ohio App. 415, 119 N.E. 2d 644 (1954); Christen v. Baker, 138 Colo. 27, 328 P.2d 951 (1958); Stop the Pay Hike Committee v. Town Council of Town of Irvington, 166 N.J. Super. 197, 399 A.2d 336 (1979); State ex rel Evans v. Blackwell, Slip copy, 2006 WL 1102804 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.), 2006-Ohio-2076.

17 407 Mass. 949, 955 (1990). Affirmed by the District Court of Massachusetts in Henry v. Conolly, 743 F. Supp. 922 (1990) and by the Court of Appeals, First Circuit, in Henry v. Conolly, 9109 F. 2d. 1000 (1990), and cited in Marino v. Town Council of Southbridge, 13 Mass.L.Rptr. 14 (2001).

18 89 P.3d 1227, 1235 (2004).

19 Stumpf v. Law, 839 P. 2d 120, 124 (1992).

20 Exhibit "B" of the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006.

21 Annex "B" of the Comment/Opposition in Intervention of Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra filed on 7 September 2006.

22 www.ulap.gov.ph.

23 www.ulap.gov.ph/reso2006-02.html.

24 The full text of the proposals of the Consultative Commission on Charter Change can be downloaded at its official website at www.concom.ph.

25 The Lambino Group's Memorandum, p. 5.

26 Under the proposed Section 1(2), Article VI of the Constitution, members of Parliament shall be elected for a term of five years "without limitation as to the number thereof."

27 Under the proposed Section 4(1), Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, the interim Parliament "shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified." Also, under the proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII, of the same Transitory Provisions, the interim Parliament "shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament."

28 Under the proposed Section 4(3), Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, the interim Parliament, within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, "shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution."

29 448 So.2d 984, 994 (1984), internal citations omitted.

30 698 P.2d 1173, 1184 (1985).

31 I RECORD 386, 392, 402-403.

32 196 P.2d 787, 790 (1948). See also Lowe v. Keisling, 130 Or.App. 1, 882 P.2d 91 (1994).

33 392 P.2d 636, 638 (1964).

34 930 P.2d 186, 196 (1996), internal citations omitted.

35 Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 118-119 (1894).

36 Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1286 (1978).

37 Id.

38 Legislature of the State of California v. EU, 54 Cal.3d 492, 509 (1991).

39 California Association of Retail Tobacconists v. State, 109 Cal.App.4th 792, 836 (2003).

40 See note 44, infra.

41 Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, p. 1294 (2003).

42 238 So.2d 824 (1970).

43 Id. at 830-832.

44 As stated by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. during the 26 September 2006 oral arguments.

45 Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 10 November 2003, 415 SCRA 44; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 142 Phil. 393 (1970); Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (1938).

46 882 P.2d 91, 96-97 (1994). On the merits, the Court in Lowe v. Keisling found the amendment in question was not a revision.

47 Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

48 Section 11(1), Article XVI of the Constitution.

49 Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution.

50 This section provides: "The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."

51 Spouses Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 760 (2001); Intia Jr. v. COA, 366 Phil. 273 (1999).

52 G.R. No. 129754, Resolution dated 23 September 1997.

53 Presidential Proclamation No. 58 dated February 11, 1987, entitled "Proclaiming the Ratification of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines Adopted by the Constitutional Commission of 1986, including the Ordinance Appended thereto."

PANGANIBAN, CJ.:

1 Chief Justice McLachlin spoke on "Liberty, Prosperity and the Rule of Law" in her speech before the Global Forum on Liberty and Prosperity held on October 18-20, 2006 in Manila. She further stated: "Without the rule of law, government officials are not bound by standards of conduct. Without the rule of law, the dignity and equality of all people is not affirmed and their ability to seek redress for grievances and societal commitments is limited. Without the rule of law, we have no means of ensuring meaningful participation by people in formulating and enacting the norms and standards which organize the kinds of societies in which we want to live."

2 GR No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 336 Phil. 848. For ease of reference, my Separate Opinion is reproduced in full:

"Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:

'(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the 'initiatory' Delfin Petition.

'(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to 'be directly proposed by the people through initiative,' there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is 'incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.'

'(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2300, 'insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void.'

"I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required number of signatures — in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district — no public funds may be spent and no government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the majority's two other rulings. Let me explain.

"Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Court's majority, the Constitution cannot be amended at all through a people's initiative. Not by Delfin, not by PIRMA, not by anyone, not even by all the voters of the country acting together. This decision will effectively but unnecessarily curtail, nullify, abrogate and render inutile the people's right to change the basic law. At the very least, the majority holds the right hostage to congressional discretion on whether to pass a new law to implement it, when there is already one existing at present. This right to amend through initiative, it bears stressing, is guaranteed by Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, as follows:

their final weapons against political excesses, opportunism, inaction, oppression and misgovernance; as well as their reserved instruments to exact transparency, accountability and faithfulness from their chosen leaders. While on the one hand, their misuse and abuse must be resolutely struck down, on the other, their legitimate exercise should be carefully nurtured and zealously protected.

"WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D. Santiago et al. and to DIRECT Respondent Commission on Elections to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the ground of prematurity, but not on the other grounds relied upon by the majority. I also vote to LIFT the temporary restraining order issued on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibits Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa from exercising their right to free speech in proposing amendments to the Constitution."

3 GR No. 129754, September 23, 1997 (still unpublished in the Philippine Reports or in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated). Again, for ease of reference, I reproduce my Separate Opinion in full:

"Petitioners assail the July 8, 1997 Resolution of Respondent Commission dismissing their petition for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Said petition before the Comelec (henceforth, PIRMA petition) was backed up by nearly six (6) million signatures constituting about 16% of the registered voters of the country with at least 3% in each legislative district. The petition now before us presents two grounds:

"1. In refusing to act on the PIRMA petition, the Comelec allegedly acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

"2. In declaring R.A. 6735 "inadequate to cover its system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution" and "declaring void those parts of Resolution 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of [an] initiative [on] amendments to the Constitution," the Supreme Court's Decision in G.R. No. 127325 entitled Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Commission on Elections (hereafter referred to as Santiago) should be reexamined because said Decision is allegedly "unconstitutional," and because, in any event, the Supreme Court itself, in reconsidering the said issue per its June 10, 1997 Resolution, was deadlocked at six votes one each side.

"The following in my position on each of these two issues:

First Issue:

No Grave Abuse of Discretion in Comelec's Refusal to Act

"The Respondent Commission's refusal to act on the "prayers" of the PIRMA petition cannot in any wise be branded as "grave abuse of discretion." Be it remembered that the Court's Decision in Santiago permanently enjoined the Comelec "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the

4 Republic v. COCOFED, 423 Phil. 735, December 14, 2001.

5 Well-entrenched is this definition of grave abuse of discretion. Id.; Benito v. Comelec, 349 SCRA 705, January 19, 2001; Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona Jr., 359 Phil. 276, November 18, 1998; and Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Confesor, 231 SCRA 41, March 10, 1994.

6 In PIRMA, I submitted as follows: "I believed, and still do, that the majority gravely erred in rendering such a sweeping injunction [that covered ANY petition, not just the Delfin petition], but I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decision's ratio decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion. Regusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the Comelec. Any other mode of action would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies."

7 42 Am. Jr. 2d, §26, citing Birmingham Gas Co. v. Bessemer; 250 Ala 137, 33 So 2d 475, 250 Ala 137; Tacker v. Board of Comrs., 127 Fla 248, 170 So 458; Hoxie V. Scott, 45 Neb 199, 63 NW 387; Gill v. Board of Comrs., 160 NC 176, 76, SE 204.

8 Partido ng Manggagawa v. Comelec, GR No. 164702, March 15, 2006.

9 Article XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)

"SEC. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon the vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

(2) A constitutional convention.

"SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people though initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

"SEC. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.

"SEC. 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

"Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition."

10 Republic Act 6735, Sec. 10, provides:

"SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures. – The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition:

(a) No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and

(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity."

11 The principle of separation of powers operates at the core of a presidential form of government. Thus, legislative power is given to the legislature; executive power, to a separate executive (from whose prominent position in the system, the presidential nomenclature is derived); and judicial power, to an independent judiciary. This system embodies interdependence by separation.

On the other hand, a parliamentary system personifies interdependence by integration, its essential features being the following: "(1) The members of the government or cabinet or the executive arm are, as a rule, simultaneously members of the legislature. (2) The government or cabinet, consisting of the political leaders of the majority party or of a coalition who are also members of the legislative, is in effect a committee of the legislature. (3) The government or cabinet has a pyramidal structure, at the apex of which is the Prime Minister or his equivalent. (4) The government or cabinet remains in power only for as long as it enjoys the support of the majority of the legislature. (5) Both government and legislature are possessed of control devices with which each can demand of the other immediate political responsibility." These control devices are a vote of no-confidence (censure), whereby the government may be ousted by the legislature; and the power of the government to dissolve the legislature and call for new elections. (J. BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES A COMMENTARY, Vol. II, 17-18 (1988 ed.).

With respect to the transformation from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, the change involves the form of representation and the lawmaking process.

12 Attached to the Opposition-in-Intervention of Intervenors OneVoice Inc., etc., is a photocopy of the Certification dated August 23, 2006, issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo, the election officer for the 3rd District and the officer-in-charge for the 1st and the 2nd Districts of Davao City. The Certification states that "this office (First, Second and Third District, Davao City) has not verified the signatures of registered voters x x x."

13 In People v. Veneracion, the Court held: "Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guide of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men, excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought 'to protect and enforce it without fear or favor,' resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs." (249 SCRA 244, October 13, 1995, per Kapunan, J.)

14 An American professor on legal philosophy, A. Altman, puts it thus: "By ratifying the constitution that included an explicit amendment process, the sovereign people committed themselves to following the rule of law, even when they wished to make changes in the basic system of government." A. ALTMAN, ARGUING ABOUT LAW 94 (2001).

15 See my Separate Opinion in Francisco Jr. v. House of Representatives, 415 SCRA 45, November 10, 2003.

16 See, for instance, the front page Malaya report entitled "Lobbyists soil dignity of Supreme Court" (October 23, 2006).

17 Lk 8:17.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

1 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.

2 SEC. 5. Requirements.— x x x

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;

c.2. the proposition;

c.3. the reason or reasons therefore;

c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;

c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6. an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.

3 SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.— For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean: x x x

(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.

4 I Record, Constitutional Commission 387-389 (July 9, 1986).

5 Community Gas and Service Company, Inc. v. Walbaum, 404 P.2d 1014, 1965 OK 118 (1965).

6 Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

7 The late Senator (then Congressman) Raul S. Roco stated this fact in his sponsorship presentation of H.B. No. 21505, thus:

x x x x

D. Prohibited Subjects.

The bill provides for two kinds of measures which cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition. A petition that embraces more than one subject cannot be submitted to the electorate as it would be violative of the constitutional proscription on passing bills containing more than one subject, and statutes involving emergency measures cannot be subject to referendum until 90 days after its effectivity. [Journal and record of the house of representatives, Second Regular Session, Vol. 6, p. 975 (February 14, 1989).]

8 Memorandum of petitioner Aumentado, p. 117.

9 The proposed Section 4(3) of Article XVIII of the Constitution states that Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. No counterpart provision was provided for members of the House of Representatives who, as members of the interim parliament under the proposed changes, shall schedule the elections for the regular parliament in its discretion.

10 The proposed Section 4(3), Article XVIII of the Constitution states that the interim parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes.

11 The United Kingdom, for instance, has a two-house parliament, the House of Lords and the House of Commons.

12 Philippine Political Law [1954 ed.], Vicente G. Sinco, pp. 43-44, quoted in Separate Opinion of J. Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in PIRMA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997, p. 7.

13 151-A Phil. 35 (1973).

14 196 P. 2d 787 (Cal. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).

15 801 P. 2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).

16 583 P. 2d 1281 (Cal. 1982).

17 Raven v. Deukmeijan, supra, citing Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P. 2d 274 (Cal. 1982).

18 Supra note 13. It may well be pointed out that in making the distinction between amendment and revision, Justice Antonio relied not only in the analogy presented in Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 37 S.E. 2d 322, but cited also the seminal ruling of the California Supreme Court in McFadden v. Jordan, supra.

19 Philippine Political Law, 1995 ed., Justice Isagani A. Cruz, p. 71, citing Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. PSC, 40 O.G., 8th Supp. 57.

20 The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., p. 1161.

21 Id.

22 Supra note 14.

23 The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1st ed., Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., p. 567, citing B. Schwartz, I The Powers of Government (1963).

24 16 C.J.S. §3 at 24.

25 14 T.M. Cooley, II Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed. (1927), p. 1349.

26 A bogus revolution, Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 11, 2006, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., p. A15.

27 Article II, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

1 Works, Letter 164.

2 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.

3 Resolution dated June 10, 1997, G.R. No. 127325.

4 G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997. Joining PIRMA as petitioners were its founding members, spouses Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa.

5 Entitled "In the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the 1987 Constitution through a People's Initiative: A Shift from a Bicameral Presidential to a Unicameral Parliamentary Government by Amending Articles VI and VII; and Providing Transitory Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the Presidential to the Parliamentary System."

6 Among them ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr., Alternative Law Groups, Inc., Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio Osmeña III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada, Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel, Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby Santiago and Reginald Pamugas, and Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong.

7 "Grounds for contempt

3. From the time the so-called People's Initiative (hereafter PI) now subject of Lambino v. Comelec, was initiated, respondents did nothing to stop what was clearly lawless, and even arguably winked at, as it were, if not condoned and allowed, the waste and misuse of its personnel, time, facilities and resources on an enterprise that had no legal basis and in fact was permanently enjoined by this Honorable Court in 1997. Seemingly mesmerized, it is time to disenthrall them.

3.1. For instance, undersigned counsel happened to be in the Senate on August 29, 2006 (on other business) when respondent Chair sought to be stopped by the body from commenting on PI out of prudential considerations, could not be restrained. On contentious issues, he volunteered that Sigaw ng Bayan would not cheat in Makati as it was the opposition territory and that the fact that out of 43,405 signatures, only 7,186 were found authentic in one Makati District, to him, showed the "efficiency" of Comelec personnel. He could not appreciate 1) that Sigaw had no choice but to get the constitutionality-required 3% in every district, [­Const., Art. VII, Sec. 2] friendly or otherwise, including administration critics' turfs, and 2) that falsus in 36,319 (93.30%) falsus in omnibus, in an exercise that could never be free, orderly, honest and credible, another constitutional requirement. [Nothing has been heard about probing and prosecuting the falsifiers.]

x x x x x x x x x

3.2. It was excessively obvious to undersigned and other observers that respondent Chairman, straining at the leash, was lawyering for Sigaw ng Bayan in the Senate! It was discomfiting that he would gloss over the seeming wholesale falsification of 96.30% of the signatures in an exercise with no credibility! Even had he been asked, he should have pled to be excused from answering as the matter could come up before the Comelec for an official collegial position (different from conceding that it is enjoined).

x x x x x x x x x

4. Respondents Commissioners Borra and Romeo A. Brawner, for their part, even issued widely-publicized written directives to the field, [Annex C, as to Commissioner Brawner; that as to Commissioner Borra will follow.] while the Commission itself was trying to be careful not to be explicit in what it was abetting implicitly, in hypocritical defiance of the injunction of 1997.

8 Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72424, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 246.

9 Supra.

10 Development Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC, March 1, 1995, 242 SCRA 59; Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VI), L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948.

11 56 O.G. 3546 cited in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VI), id.

12 Supra.

13 Separate Opinion of Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997.

14 G.R. No. 109645, March 4, 1996, 254 SCRA 234.

15 Philippine National Bank v. Palma, G.R. No. 157279, August 9, 2005, 466 CSRA 307, citing Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary (1988), 3rd ed. (citing Santiago v. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397, [1947]).

16 Id., citing Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126183, March 25, 1999, 305 SCRA 303, citing Government v. Jalandoni, No. 837-R, August 30, 1947, 44 O.G. 1840.

17 Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1921), pp. 33-34.

18 William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc.,) 1973, p. 49.

19 Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 296.

20 July 9, 1986. Records of the Constitutional Commission, No. 26.

21 Bernas, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, 1996 Ed., p. 1161.

22 242 N. W. 891 259 Mich 212.

23 State v. Orange [Tex. x. Civ. App.] 300 SW 2d 705, People v. Perkins 137, p. 55.

18 City of Midland v. Arbury 38 Mich. App. 771, 197 N.W. 2d 134.

25 Adams v. Gunter Fla, 238 So. 2d 824.

26 196 P.2d 787.

27 Adams v. Gunter Fla. 238 So.2d 824.

28 Mc Fadden v. Jordan, supra.

29 Rivera-Cruz v. Gray, 104 So.2d 501, p. 505 (Fla. 1958).

30 Joaquin Bernas, Sounding Board: AMENDMENT OR REVISION, Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 25, 2006.

31 See Sections 8-12 for national initiative and referendum, and sections 13-19 for local initiative and referendum.

32 Section 2. Statement of Policy. – The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.

33 Section 3. Definition of terms.-

x x x

a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;

x x x

34 See Section 3(e).

35 Section 5 (b) – A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.

x x x

36 Section 9 (b) – The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

37 7 How (48 US) 1 (1849).

38 328 US 549 (1946).

39 77 Phil. 192 (1946).

40 103 Phi. 1051 (1957).

41 G.R. No. 35546, September 17, 1974, 50 SCRA 559.

42 369 US 186 (1962).

43 G.R. No. 85344, December 21, 1989, 180 SCRA 496.

44 G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 668.

45 Nos. L-36142, L-36164, L-36165, L-36236, and L-36283, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

1 Entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.

2 Section 2(1), Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution.

3 Petition, pp. 12-14.

4 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129368, August 25, 2003, 409 SCRA 455, 480.

5 Rodson Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appears, G.R. No. 141857, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 469, 480.

6 People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610.

7 Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Galauran & Pilares Construction Co., G.R. No. L-35630, November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 664.

8 People v. Court of Appeals, supra.

9 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.

10 Article 8, New Civil Code provides that "[j]udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines."

11 Suson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126749, August 27, 1997, 278 SCRA 284.

12 Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992, 208 SCRA 254.

13 974 S.W.2d 451 (1998).

14 Id. at 453.

15 Entitled In Re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative in the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws.

16 Supra note 10, p. 157.

17 G.R. No. 129754.

18 Minute Resolution, September 23, 1997, pp. 1-2.

19 Republic v. De los Angeles, No. L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422.

20 Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila, No. L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948.

21 Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506.

22 Then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Justices Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan and Justo P. Torres, Jr. fully concurred in the ponencia of Justice Davide.

23 Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Vicente V. Mendoza, Reynato S. Puno, Ricardo J. Francisco, Jr. and Artemio V. Panganiban (now Chief Justice).

24 The voting on the motion for reconsideration was as follows: Six Justices, namely, Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan, voted to deny the motions for lack of merit; and six Justices, namely, Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco, Jr., Regino C. Hermosisima and Panganiban voted to grant the same. Justice Vitug maintained his opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication. Justices Teodoro R. Padilla and Torres inhibited from participation in the deliberations.

25 House Bill No. 457 filed by then Rep. Nachura during the Twelfth Congress.

26 See Pagdayawon v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 154569, September 23, 2002, 389 SCRA 480.

27 London Street Tramways Co., Ltd. v. London County Council, [1898] A.C. 375, cited in COOLEY, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 117-118.

28 Amended Petition for Initiative, pp. 4-7.

29 Id. at 7.

30 I Records of the Constitutional Commission 373.

31 Id. at 371.

32 Id. at 386.

33 Id. at 392.

34 Id. at 402-403.

35 No. L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30.

36 Id. at 367.

37 SINCO, Philippine Political Law 43-44.

38 37 S.E.2d 322 (1946).

39 Id. at 330.

40 Id.

41 Sounding Board, Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 3, 2006.

42 Introduction to the Journal of the Constitutional Commission.

43 BLACK, Constitutional Law 1-2, citing 1 BOUV. INST. 9.

44 SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1.

45 Proclamation No. 58, 83 O.G. No. 23, pp. 2703-2704, June 8, 1987.

46 See McBee v. Brady, 15 Idaho 761, 100 P. 97 (1909).

47 Id.

48 196 P.2d 787 (1948).

49 Id. at 798.

50 Ellingham v. Dye, 99 N.E. 1 (1912).

51 Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno, p. 36.

52 Id. at 39.

53 Supra note 38.

54 McFadden v. Jordan, supra note 48.

55 Id. at 799.

56 Supra note 41.

57 Annex "1363."

58 Annex "1368."

59 Annex "1369."

60 Annex "1370."

61 Annex "1371."

62 Annex "1372."

63 Annex "1374."

64 Annex "1375."

65 Annex "1376."

66 Annex "1377."

67 Annex "1378."

68 Annex "1379."

69 Annex "1380."

70 Annex "1381."

71 Annex "1382."

72 Annex "1383."

73 Annex "1385."

74 Annex "1387."

75 Annex "1388."

76 Annex "1389."

77 Annex "1391."

78 Annex "1392."

79 Annex "1393."

80 Annex "1395."

81 Annex "1396."

82 Annex "1397."

83 Annex "1398."

84 Annex "1399."

85 Annex "1400."

86 Annex "1401."

87 Annex "1402."

88 Annex "1404."

89 Annex "1405."

90 Annex "1406."

91 Annex "1407."

92 Annex "1408."

93 Annex "1409."

94 Annex "1410."

95 Annex "1411."

96 Annex "1412."

97 Arroyo, Jr. v. Taduran, G.R. No. 147012, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 423.

98 See, for example, Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, No. L-62089, March 9, 1988, 158 SCRA 508.

99 Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 145851, November 22, 2001, 370 SCRA 394.

100 Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002, 393 SCRA 639.

101 Teope v. People, G.R. No. 149687, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 540.

102 Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).

103 Id.

104 G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997, 277 SCRA 268, 311-312.

105 Dissenting Opinion of Justice Fernando in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, supra note 36.

106 119 N.W. 408 (1909).

107 22 Minn. 400 (1876).

108 96 S.W. 396 (1906).

109 63 N.J. Law 289.

110 77 Miss. 543 (1900).

111 Section 1, Article II, 1987 Constitution.

112 Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno, p. 49.

113 COOLEY, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 56, cited in Ellingham v. Dye, supra.

114 Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal. Co., 154 N.W. 1037 (1915).

115 ALTMAN, ARGUING ABOUT THE LAW 94 (2001), citing AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984)

116 McBee v. Brady, 100 P. 97 (1909).

117 McFadden v. Jordan, supra note 48.

118 Cooley, Am.Law.Rev. 1889, p. 311, cited in Ellingham v. Dye, supra.

119 15 N.W. 609 (1883).

120 Id. at 630.

AZCUNA, J.:

1 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997 and June 10, 1997.

2 100 Phil. 501 (1956).

PUNO, J.:

1 M'cCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 407 (1819).

2 Section 1, Article II, 1987 Constitution.

3 270 SCRA 106, March 19, 1997.

4 Id. at 153.

5 Id. at 157.

6 Justice Teodoro R. Padilla did not take part in the deliberation as he was related to a co-petitioner and co-counsel of petitioners.

7 Justice Davide (ponente), Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, and Kapunan.

8 Resolution dated June 10, 1997, G.R. No. 127325.

9 People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997.

10 Amended Petition for Initiative, pp. 4-7.

11 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.

12 Petition, pp. 12-14.

13 Advisory issued by Court, dated September 22, 2006.

14 Exhibit "B," Memorandum of Petitioner Lambino.

15 Barnhart, Principled Pragmatic Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases, 80 Notre Dame Law Rev., 1911-1912, (May 2005).

16 Ibid.

17 Id. at 1913.

18 Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare Decisis: Casey, Dickerson and the Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 53 Utah Law Rev. 53, 67 (2002).

19 Id. at 68.

20 Id. at 69.

21 Id. at 67.

22 Id. at 69.

23 Consovoy, supra note 18, at 57.

24 Id. at 58.

25 Id. at 64.

26 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 405-06 (1932) (Justice Brandeis, dissenting).

27 Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-492 (Justice Frankfurter, concurring).

28 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89 (1987) (Justice Stevens, dissenting).

29 Barnhart, supra note 15, at 1922.

30 Id. at 1921.

31 Filippatos, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Protection of Civil Rights and Liberties in the Rehnquist Court, 11 Boston College Third World Law Journal, 335, 343 (Summer 1991).

32 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

33 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

34 G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004, 445 SCRA 1.

35 G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000, 343 SCRA 377.

36 Barnhart, supra note 15, at 1915.

37 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).

38 Section 5(b).

39 Ibid.

40 Santiago v. Commission on Elections, supra note 11, at 145.

41 85 Record of the House of Representatives 140-142 (February 14, 1989).

42 85 Record of the house of representatives 142-143 (February 14, 1989).

43 Zeringue v. State Dept. of Public Safety, 467 So. 2d 1358.

44 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 386, 392 (July 9, 1986).

45 Id. at 400, 402-403.

46 v record, constitutional commission 806 (October 10, 1986).

47 Opposition-in-Intervention filed by ONEVOICE, p. 39.

48 Opposition-in-Intervention filed by Alternative Law Groups, Inc., p. 30.

49 Introduction to Political Science, pp. 397-398.

50 Section 1, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution.

51 Eighth Edition, p. 89 (2004).

52 Ibid.

53 Id. at 1346.

54 Ibid.

55 Third Edition, p. 67 (1969).

56 Id. at 68.

57 Id. at 1115.

58 Vicente G. Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 2nd ed., p. 46.

59 Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, No. L-361432, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 367-368.

60 J. M. Aruego, The New Philippine Constitution Explained, iii-iv (1973).

61 E. Quisumbing-Fernando, Philippine Constitutional Law, pp. 422-425 (1984).

62 N. Gonzales, Philippine Political Law 30 (1969 ed.).

63 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317, 337 quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. 365, 3 Alt. 220 (1886).

64 L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 367.

65 i record, constitutional commission 373 (July 8, 1986).

66 The opinion was actually made by Justice Felix Antonio.

67 Javellana v. Executive Secretary, supra note 64, citing Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 37 S.E.2d 322, 327 (1946).

68 T. M. Cooley, I A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 143-144 (8th ed. 1927).

69 H.C. Black, Handbook of American Constitutional Law S. 47, p. 67 (2nd ed. 1897).

70 V. Sinco, supra note 58.

71 Ibid.

72 No. L-1232, 79 Phil. 819, 826 (1948).

73 IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 735 (September 17, 1986).

74 Id. at 752.

75 Id. at 769.

76 Id. at 767-769.

77 Id. at 377.

78 Id. at 395.

79 Sinco, supra note 58, at 22.

80 Id. at 20-21.

81 Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996, 257 SCRA 727.

82 G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 530.

83 Sinco, supra note 58, at 29.

84 State v. Moore, 103 Ark 48, 145 SW 199 (1912); Whittemore v. Seydel, 74 Cal App 2d 109 (1946).

85 Town of Whitehall v. Preece, 1998 MT 53 (1998).

86 G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996, 262 SCRA 492, 516-517, citing 42 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 653.

87 Memorandum for petitioner Aumentado, pp. 151-152.

88 Id. at 153-154.

89 L-44640, October 12, 1976, 73 SCRA 333, 360-361.

90 Section 2, Article XVII, 1987 Constitution.

91 Annex "3," Opposition-In-Intervention of Oppositors-Intervenors ONEVOICE, INC., et al.

92 Certification dated April 21, 2006 issued by Reynne Joy B. Bullecer, Annex "B," Memorandum of Oppositor-Intervenor Pimentel, et al.; Certification dated April 20, 2006 issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo, Annex "C," Memorandum of Oppositor-Intervenor Pimentel, et al.; Certification dated April 26, 2006 issued by Atty. Marlon S. Cascuejo, Annex "D," Memorandum of Oppositor-Intervenor Pimentel, et al.

93 Annex "1," Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Antonino.

94 Annex "10-A," Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al.

95 Annexes 1-29, Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Alternative Law Groups, Inc.

96 Annexes 30-31, Id.

97 Annexes 44-64, Id.

98 Consolidated Reply of Petitioner Aumentado, p. 54.

99 Exhibit "E," Memorandum of Petitioner Lambino.

100 Annex "A," Consolidated Response of Petitioner Aumentado.

101 Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Pimentel, et al., pp. 12-13.

102 Helvey v. Wiseman, 199 F. Supp. 200, 8 A.F.T.2d 5576 (1961).

103 BNO Leasing Corp. v. Hollins & Hollins, Inc., 448 So.2d 1329 (1984).

104 ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

How many copies of the petition, that you mention(ed), did you print?

ATTY. LAMBINO:

We printed 100 thousand of this petition last February and we

distributed to the different organizations that were volunteering to support us.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

So, you are sure that you personally can say to us that 100 thousand of

these were printed?

ATTY. LAMBINO:

It could be more than that, Your Honor.

x x x x x x x x x x x x

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

But you asked your friends or your associates to re-print, if they can(?)

ATTY. LAMBINO:

Yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

Okay, so you got 6.3 Million signatures, but you only printed 100

thousand. So you're saying, how many did your friends print of the petition?

ATTY. LAMBINO:

I can no longer give a specific answer to that, Your Honor. I relied

only to the assurances of the people who are volunteering that they are going to

reproduce the signature sheets as well as the draft petition that we have given them, Your Honor.

x x x x x x x x x x x x

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

Did you also show this amended petition to the people?

ATTY. LAMBINO:

Your Honor, the amended petition reflects the copy of the original

petition that we circulated, because in the original petition that we filed before the COMELEC, we omitted a certain paragraph that is, Section 4 paragraph 3 which were part of the original petition that we circulated and so we have to correct that oversight because that is what we have circulated to the people and we have to correct that…

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

But you just stated now that what you circulated was the petition of

August 25, now you are changing your mind, you're saying what you circulated was the petition of August 30, is that correct?

ATTY. LAMBINO:

In effect, yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

So, you circulated the petition of August 30, but what you filed in the

COMELEC on August 25 was a different petition, that's why you have to amend it?

ATTY. LAMBINO:

We have to amend it, because there was an oversight, Your Honor, that

we have omitted one very important paragraph in Section 4 of our proposition.

x x x x x x x x x x x x

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

Okay, let's be clear. What did you circulate when you gathered the

signatures, the August 25 which you said you circulated or the August 30?

ATTY. LAMBINO:

Both the August 25 petition that included all the provisions, Your

Honor, and as amended on August 30. Because we have to include the one that

we have inadvertently omitted in the August 25 petition, Your Honor.

x x x x x x x x x x x x

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

And (you cannot tell that) you can only say for certain that you printed

100 thousand copies?

ATTY. LAMBINO:

That was the original printed matter that we have circulated by the

month of February, Your Honor, until some parts of March, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

That is all you can assure us?

ATTY. LAMBINO:

That is all I can assure you, Your Honor, except that I have asked some

friends, like for example (like) Mr. Liberato Laos to help me print out some more of this petition… (TSN, September 26, 2006, pp. 7-17)

105 Section 2 (1), Article IX – C, 1987 Constitution.

106 Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and Justices Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan, Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. and Justo P. Torres.

107 Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Ricardo J. Francisco and Artemio V. Panganiban.

108 Justice Jose C. Vitug.

109 Only fourteen (14) justices participated in the deliberations as Justice Teodoro R. Padilla took no part on account of his relationship with the lawyer of one of the parties.

110 Citing conscience as ground.

111 409 U.S. 188, 93 S. Ct. 375, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1972).

112 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722, 1730 n. 7, 95 L. Ed. 2d (1987); France v. Nelson, 292 Ark. 219, 729 S.W. 2d 161 (1987).

113 40 P. 3d 886 (2006).

114 781 P. 2d 973 (Alaska, 1989).

115 Id. at 982-84 (Compton, J., concurring).

116 Id. at 975-78.

117 Negri v. Slotkin, 244 N.W. 2d 98 (1976).

118 112 Fla. 734, 151 So. 284 (1933).

119 Penned by Justice Whitfield, and concurred in by Chief Justice Davis and Justice Terrell; Justices Ellis, Brown and Buford are of the opinion that chapter 15938, Acts of 1933, is a special or local law not duly advertised before its passage, as required by sections 20 and 21 of article 3 of the state Constitution, and therefore invalid. This evenly divided vote resulted in the affirmance of the validity of the statute but did not constitute a binding precedent on the Court.

120 62 S. Ct. 552 (1942).

121 329 F. 2d 541 (1964).

122 239 F. 2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956).

123 Citing Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 30 S. Ct. 621 (1910).

124 331 N.E. 2d 65 (1975).

125 Neil v. Biggers, supra note 108.

126 Catherwood v. Caslon, 13 Mees. & W. 261; Beamish v. Beamish, 9 H. L. Cas. 274.

127 Maglalang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85692, July 31, 1989, 175 SCRA 808, 811, 812; Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar, G.R. No. 96921, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 118.

128 No. L-35440, August 19, 1982, 115 SCRA 839, citing Anticamara v. Ong, No. L-29689, April 14, 1978, 82 SCRA 337.

129 Supra note 1.

QUISUMBING, J.:

1 Political questions have been defined as "Questions of which the courts of justice will refuse to take cognizance, or to decide, on account of their purely political character, or because their determination would involve an encroachment upon the executive or legislative powers; e.g., what sort of government exists in a state…." Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1319 citing Kenneth v. Chambers, 14 How. 38, 14 L.Ed. 316.

2 See 1987 Const., Art. XVII, Sec. 2.

3 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.

4 G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997.

CORONA, J.:

1 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616.

2 336 Phil. 848 (1997).

3 Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134787, 15 November 2005, 475 SCRA 1.

4 Feria and Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, vol. I, 2001 edition, p. 419.

5 Sec. 30, Petitions and initiatives by the people, 16 Am Jur 2d 380, citing State ex rel. Stenberg v. Beermann, 240 Neb. 754, 485 N.W. 2d 151 (1992).

6 Id. citing Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board of Elections, 83 Ill. 2d 236, 47 Ill. Dec. 363, 415 N.E. 2d 368 (1980).

7 Balitzer, Alfred, The Initiative and Referendum: A Study and Evaluation of Direct Legislation, The California Roundtable 13 (1981). The American Founding Fathers recognized that direct democracy posed a profound threat to individual rights and liberty. The U.S. Constitution was "designed to provide a system of government that would prevent either a tyranny of the majority or a tyranny of the few." James Madison "warned against the power of a majority or a minority of the population 'united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interest of the community.'

8 Gilbert Hahn & Steven C. Morton, Initiative and Referendum – Do They Encourage or Impair Better State Government? 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925, 927 (1977).

9 Florida Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations, Initiatives and Referenda: Issues in Citizen Lawmaking (1986).

10 Sec. 1, Article II, Constitution.

11 In re Initiative Petition No. 362 State Question 669, 899 P.2d 1145 (Okla. 1995).

TINGA, J.:

1 G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997, 270 SCRA 106.

2 G.R. No. 129754, 23 September 1997.

3 Petitioner Aumentado aptly refers to the comment of the late Senator Raul Roco that the Santiago ruling "created a third specie of invalid laws, a mongrel type of constitutional but inadequate and, therefore, invalid law." Memorandum for Aumentado, p. 54.

4 See Civil Code, Art. 9.

5 456 Phil. 1 (2003).

6 Id., at 10; citing I Arturo M. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines 43 (1990) and Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 113 (1921).

7 See Dissenting Opinion, Manila International Airport Authority v. City of Parañaque, G.R. No. 155650, 20 July 2006. In my ponencia in Globe Telecom v. NTC, G.R. No. 143964, 26 July 2004, 435 SCRA 110, I further observed that while an administrative agency was not enslaved to obey its own precedent, it was "essential, for the sake of clarity and intellectual honesty, that if an administrative agency decides inconsistently with previous action, that it explain thoroughly why a different result is warranted, or if need be, why the previous standards should no longer apply or should be overturned." Id., at 144. Happily, Justice Puno's present opinion expressly elucidates why Santiago should be reversed.

8 As Justice Frankfurter once wrote: "We recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social policy. It represents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations. But stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience… This Court, unlike the House of Lords, has from the beginning rejected a doctrine of disability at self-correction." Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-121 (1940).

9 351 Phil. 692 (1998).

10As Chief Justice Panganiban then cited: "For instance, Ebralinag vs. Davision Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256, March 1, 1993, reversed the Court's 34-year-old doctrine laid down in Gerona vs. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil 2, August 12, 1959, and upheld the right of Jehovah's Witnesses "to refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs." Similarly, Olaguer vs. Military Commission, 150 SCRA 144, May 22, 1987, abandoned the 12-year-old ruling in Aquino Jr. vs. Military Commission, 63 SCRA 546, May 9, 1975, which recognized the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try civilians for offenses allegedly committed during martial law. The Court likewise reversed itself in EPZA vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305, April 29, 1987, when it vacated its earlier ruling in National Housing Authority vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 245, June 29, 1983, on the validity of certain presidential decrees regarding the determination of just compensation. In the much earlier case of Philippine Trust Co. vs. Mitchell, 59 Phil. 30, December 8, 1933, the Court revoked its holding in Involuntary Insolvency of Mariano Velasco & Co., 55 Phil 353, November 29, 1930, regarding the relation of the insolvency law with the then Code of Civil Procedure and with the Civil Code. Just recently, the Court, in Kilosbayan vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540, July 17, 1995, also abandoned the earlier grant of standing to petitioner-organization in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110, May 5, 1994." Id., at 780.

11 Ibid.

12 129 Phil. 507, 516 (1967).

13 G.R. Nos. L-78461, L-79146, & L-79212, 12 August 1987, 153 SCRA 67, 75.

14 G.R. No. 160427, 15 September 2004, 438 SCRA 319, 326.

15 Ibid.

16 G.R. No. 155855, 26 January 2004, 421 SCRA 92.

17 Id., at 104. Relatedly, the Court held that "[c] ontests which do not involve the election, returns and qualifications of elected officials are not subjected to the exercise of the judicial or quasi-judicial powers of courts or administrative agencies". Ibid.

18 See e.g., Memorandum of Oppositors-Intervenors Senators Pimentel, Jr., et. al., pp. 19-22; Memorandum for Intervenor Senate of the Philippines, pp. 34-35.

19 See 1987 Const., Art. VI, Sec. 26(1). See also Section 19[1]. 1987 Const, Art. VIII.

20 See e.g., Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288, 291 (1941); Cordero v. Hon. Jose Cabatuando, et al., 116 Phil. 736, 741 (1962).

21 See Tio v. VRB, G.R. No. L-75697, 18 June 1987, 151 SCRA 208, 214-215; citing Public Service Co., Recktenwald, 290 Ill. 314, 8 A.L.R. 466, 470. See also Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 147387 & 152161, 10 December 2003, 417 SCRA 503, 519.

22 "As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title - one subject rule." Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy, 346 Phil. 321, 359 (1997).

23 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 83896 & 83815; 22 February 1991, 194 SCRA 317.

24 Id. at 337. I have previously expressed my own doubts in relying on the constitutional or legislative deliberations as a definitive source of construction. "It is easy to selectively cite passages, sometimes out of their proper context, in order to assert a misleading interpretation. The effect can be dangerous. Minority or solitary views, anecdotal ruminations, or even the occasional crude witticisms, may improperly acquire the mantle of legislative intent by the sole virtue of their publication in the authoritative congressional record. Hence, resort to legislative deliberations is allowable when the statute is crafted in such a manner as to leave room for doubt on the real intent of the legislature." Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Phil. Cement Manufacturers, G.R. No. G.R. No. 158540, 8 July 2004, 434 SCRA 65, 95.

25 77 Phil. 192 (1946).

26Id. at 215.

27 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra note 23, at 338; citing Household Finance Corporation v. Shaffner, 203 S.W. 2d 734, 356 Mo. 808.

28 See Sections 5(b) & 8, Rep. Act No. 6735. See also 1987 Const., Sec. 2, Art. XVI.

29 G.R. No. 151944, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 365.

30 Id., at 377. Emphasis supplied.

31 See Sections 5(b) & 8, Rep. Act No. 6735. See also 1987 Const., Sec. 2, Art. XVI.

32From the "Funeral Oration" by Pericles, as recorded by Thucydides in the History of the Peloponnesian War.

33H. Zinn, A People's History of the United States (1980 ed.), at 95.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

1 The full text of the Preamble reads:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

2 Article XVII, Constitution.

3 G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997, 270 SCRA 106.

4 Id. at 157.

5 Id. at 124.

6 Olac v. Rivera, G.R. No. 84256, 2 September 1992, 213 SCRA 321, 328-329; See also the more recent cases of Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 155108, 27 April 2005, 457 SCRA 400; and PH Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 821 (2001).

7 Supra note 2 at 124.

8 G.R. No. 129754.

9 Separate Opinion of former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. to the Resolution, dated 23 September 1997, in G.R. No. 129754, PIRMA v. COMELEC, pp. 2-3.

10 Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals, 376 Phil. 628, 650 (1999).

11 Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118651, 16 October 1997.

12 Santiago v. Comelec, supra note 2 at 170-171.

13 Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 352.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

1 G.R. No. 127535, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.

2 Id.

3 Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu v. Province of Cebu, G.R. No. 141386, November 29, 2001, 371 SCRA 196, 202.

4 United Harbor Pilots' Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Association of International Shipping Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 133763, November 13, 2002, 391 SCRA 522, 533.

5 PH Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals and Carlos M. Farrales, G. R. No. 109648, November 22, 2001, 370 SCRA 155, 166-167.

6 Id.

7 Florentino v. Rivera, et al., G. R. No. 167968, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 522, 529.

8 G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997.

9 V. Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Principles and Concept 46 (1962).